

of the Absolute One as triune and creative, is totally in conflict with Proclus' notion that the Absolute One is not the intelligible father who causes all things; for, according to Proclus, the primal God is the generator of the plurality of gods, only some of whom are fathers.

Lyndon LaRouche, who has been able to study the *Parmenides* directly, arrives at the same conclusions concerning the dialogue which Cusanus was able to distill from Proclus' methodologically erroneous *Commentary*. Whereas Proclus interprets the *Parmenides* as the allegorical expression of a positive philosophical system, LaRouche correctly sees the dialogue as a polemic against the Eleatic school of philosophy represented by both Parmenides and Zeno. For LaRouche, what Plato does in the *Parmenides* is to demonstrate the absurd and self-contradictory conclusions to which one is led by deductive succession from the axiomatic assumptions of the philosophy of Parmenides, in which the One is conceived as static or linear.

LaRouche argues in effect that what Plato proves in the *Parmenides* dialogue is precisely the same thing that Cusanus proves in "On Squaring the Circle." In the latter, Cusanus shows that the perimeter of a polygon can never be made co-extensive with that of a circle by the method of exhaustion; in fact, the more sides the polygon has, the more points it has at which it is distant from the circle. Similarly, as long as Parmenides assumes that unity is incapable of qualitative change, and is rather measurable by simple linear extension, his attempts to define the relationship of the many to the One will necessarily fail.

Although Proclus was unable to remove the real Plato entirely from his *Commentary*, it is this concept of the Absolute One as Creator, of the universe as capable of qualitative change, and of man as capable of effecting qualitative change through his use of reason—all implicit in Plato's devastating polemic against Parmenides' linearity—which eluded him, and which LaRouche, using the method of Cusanus and Plato, has found.

—William F. Wertz, Jr.

Yearning for the Malthusian Millennium


Admittedly, British-born, Yale University historian Paul Kennedy has compiled an impressive array of data and has taken up some provocative and challenging themes. But, for the most part, his work is a mixture of monumental incompetence combined with disinformation and fraud.

Kennedy is arguing for a new geopolitical cult rooted primarily in an updated version of the worldview of Parson Thomas Malthus. The driving force, and central threat, in Kennedy's world, as in the late eighteenth century of Malthus, is demographic growth. Rapid demographic growth is a determining factor in causing wars and political instability, with the added twist today that it also damages the "global environment." Combatting the threat of "overpopulation," in Kennedy's view, justifies, or necessitates, an imperial world order ruled by rentier-financier interests.

'Winners and Losers'

Technology, such as it exists in Paul Kennedy's future universe, will predominantly help those who are at present better off—primarily the Japanese and several European nations—and hurt the worst-off, the Africans being at the bottom of the heap. The only two frontier technological developments that he grants real significance to are biotechnology and robotics. Biotechnology will certainly increase food production, but it will be dominated by powerful multinational corporations and will be effectively denied to the developing sector. Robotics, meanwhile, will mainly work to the benefit of Japan and a handful of other countries, but will progressively undermine manufacturing labor, thereby further hurting countries with large populations, which require "labor-intensive" approaches.

What this combination of demographically determined history and selectively developed technology adds



Preparing for the
Twenty-First Century
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up to, in Kennedy's view, is that the world inevitably has "winners and losers," as in a sports match: "History is, once again, producing its lists of winners and losers. Economic change and technological development, like wars or sporting tournaments, are usually not beneficial to all."

Consistent with this, is Kennedy's view that "Malthus' England" is an example of a "winner" in history. "Malthus' England," of course, is a term synonymous with "the British Empire," which "won" only because it conquered and devastated other peoples. Kennedy is less than frank, employing British diplomatic euphemism instead, as when he attempts to contrast how "the British escaped their Malthusian trap" with the case of India, which is "much closer to Malthus' model." India's population, he writes, "also doubled and redoubled in the nineteenth century, but on a much less productive base. Furthermore, because the Indian states had been unable to resist Britain's East India Company militarily, their subjects could

do little when British machine-made textiles—not only cheaper but of better quality than native cloth—poured into the country, driving out traditional domestic producers in the process.”

His convoluted formulation, “unable to resist Britain’s East India Company militarily” is a typical semantic trick, to cover up for the fact that British colonialists reduced the Indian population by about half in the first decades of colonial rule. He also never mentions that Malthus was the paid scribe of the British East India Company.

Kennedy is obviously nostalgic for an imperial system now, one that could wage war against “overpopulated” non-white nations. What this means for the victims, the “losers,” in Africa and elsewhere today, is clear: “Civil or external wars—with their heavy casualties—were, like famine and disease, among the malthusian antidotes to a population

explosion, and perhaps the most effective of all because they killed people in the prime of life.”

Who Will Inherit the Earth?

Kennedy is a committed backer of the “global financial system,” and his twenty-first century options are all defined by the preservation of that system. For him, the International Monetary Fund is the hero of the international trading and financial system. If Africa and Ibero-America are being strangled by debt, it’s essentially their own fault. Those who don’t master the ways of “the market” will be “losers”: “The reality nowadays is that any government which offends international finance’s demand for unrestricted gain . . . will find its capital has fled and its currency weakened. . . . The message is clear: if you do not follow the rules of the market, your economy will suffer.”

Options for Africa’s salvation are excluded for the simple reason that Africa “cannot pay.” “Poorer countries simply can’t pay for large irrigation schemes,” he writes. Were China and India to really develop, he insists, this would have “appalling consequences for their environments” and would “also threaten the earth’s overall atmosphere.”

Ultimately, Kennedy’s is the pagan world of the usurer. From the standpoint of Christianity—and the other great faiths—Paul Kennedy, and those who think like him, might do well to ponder what Jesus Christ meant, in the Sermon on the Mount, when He said, “The meek shall inherit the earth.” If the human race survives this extremely grave period, surely the “winners” will not be those who think like the author of *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*.

—Mark Burdman

An Ugly Geopolitical Soul

Anyone wishing to know how and why the United States has come to such a sorry pass over the last decades, would do well to read George Kennan’s *Around the Cragged Hill*.

As the avowed personal and political philosophy of this old Soviet hand and longstanding member of the U.S. policy elite, Kennan’s book provides ample evidence that geopolitics as a world outlook must inevitably result in explicitly anti-human policies.

As one of the leading theorists and practitioners of geopolitics in the U.S. elite, Kennan developed the policy of “containment” of post-war Soviet power.

That this policy was firmly rooted in balance-of-power politics is evident from his attitude toward the Yalta agreements. His main objection was not that they sold out Eastern Europe to Moscow, but that they did not define spheres of influence firmly enough.


In a February 1945 letter to his friend and fellow Foreign Service officer, Chip Bohlen, Kennan complained: “Why could we not make a decent and

definitive compromise with it—divide Europe frankly into spheres of influence—keep ourselves out of the Russian sphere and keep the Russians out of ours?”

This same cynical outlook pervades *Around the Cragged Hill*, which Kennan in part devotes to a new geopolitical scheme he’s concocted, one predicated on dismembering the largest “monster” nations, such as the U.S., China, India, and Brazil.

“New modalities and institutions for collaboration,” he writes, “will have to be devised to absorb burdens of authority that the emerging nations are unable to bear, and to accept other burdens that some of the older nations are unwilling to continue to bear alone,” such as environmental problems and “overpopulation.”

To solve these alleged problems he advocates breaking up the U.S. into “a dozen constituent republics,” which would absorb “not only the powers of the existing states but a considerable part of those of the present Federal establishment.”



Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal and Political Philosophy

by George Kennan
W.W. Norton & Company
New York/London, 1993
272 pages, hardbound, \$22.95

Kennan has an apparently limitless contempt for humanity. In discussing population growth, he quotes his former boss, William Bullitt, that mankind is “a skin disease of the earth,” a view with which Kennan wholeheartedly concurs.

“There is an optimal balance,” he